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Corporate Governance as a School of Social Reform 
Ciarán O’Kelly* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In this paper, I present a vision of the corporation as a moral per-
son. I point to “the separation of ownership and control”1 as a moment 
when the corporation broke away from the moral lives of owner-
managers. I then draw out the manner in which we can speak of the 
company as a moral person. Finally, through a discussion of social re-
porting in two British banks, I point to a shift in how this moral person-
hood is articulated, with the rise of corporate governance—or doing 
business well—as its own foundation of corporate responsibility. I pro-
pose a view of corporate responsibility as a “transmission mechanism” 
for the company’s role in moral life, situated in the broader social con-
ception of “moral economy.”2 This viewpoint sets out landscapes of le-
gitimation and justification through which the ties that underpin econom-
ic life are founded. 
II. THE MORAL ECONOMIES OF CAPITALISM 
The company—as it was first encountered during the Industrial 
Revolution—was often regarded as destabilizing and subverting estab-
lished social norms. Politicians expressed concern about disruption of the 
family and the domestic sphere caused by industrialization, and so they 
sought reforms aimed at restoring the domestic sphere as a moral center 
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 1. The separation of ownership and control refers to the emergence of a managerial class asso-
ciated with, but not identical to, an unconcentrated shareholding population. ADOLF BERLE & 
GARDINER MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY ch. 1 (1932). 
 2. Moral economy refers to discourses regarding the relationship between prevailing norms of 
fairness and the broad facts of economic distribution. E. P. THOMPSON, THE MORAL ECONOMY OF 
THE ENGLISH CROWD IN THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY, PAST & PRESENT 76 (1971); see, e.g., JAMES 
SCOTT, THE MORAL ECONOMY OF THE PEASANT (1976). 
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in people’s lives.3 In fictional accounts from the period, redemption for 
owner-managers was held to be available through encounters with do-
mestic life.4 
The moral transformation of Mr. Thornton in Elizabeth Gaskell’s 
North and South sets out an instructive picture of the link between indus-
trial capitalism and the capitalist in this era. Gaskell’s portrayal of “pow-
erful and invisible social processes in visible forms”5 is instructive for 
this paper’s purpose. Her narrative serves as an account of the wavering 
line between public and private in industrial capitalism. It also gives the 
reader a good reference point with which to set out the distinct character 
of the company cast free of the capitalist. 
Gaskell, who “writes in a city in which industrial production and a 
dominant market are the determining features, and in which . . . there is 
the new hard language of class against class,”6 sets North and South in 
the town of Milton, based on her native Manchester. Milton is experi-
enced through the eyes of Margaret Hale, who witnesses the town as riv-
en with class conflict, especially as expressed in struggles between Mr. 
Thornton, a mill owner and manager, and Mr. Higgins, a worker. 
In the early stages of the novel, Mr. Thornton is portrayed as view-
ing his responsibilities toward his workers as purely formal and proce-
dural. He regards himself as a “benign despot,” ruling over his “hands” 
in the mill and having no regard for them beyond the factory gates.7 
North and South turns in large part on the shifts in Mr. Thornton’s feel-
ings, not toward the workforce so much as toward his own sense of how 
production, management, and responsibilities all interrelate. 
Mr. Thornton finds redemption in his encounters with domesticity 
through the family lives of the Hales and of Mr. Higgins. Over the course 
of the novel, Mr. Thornton is redeemed by his encounters with the do-
mestic sphere. He is brought to a point where he devotes attention to the 
welfare of workers, sees them as human beings rather than as hands, and 
expresses a wish to engage them in cooperative “discourse . . . beyond 
the cash nexus,”8 including sharing meals and plans with them. “The pri-
                                                 
 3. See Timothy L. Alborn, The Moral of the Failed Bank, 38 VICTORIAN STUD. 199 (1995). 
 4. See CATHERINE GALLAGHER, THE INDUSTRIAL REFORMATION OF ENGLISH FICTION (1988). 
 5. Andrew H. Miller, Subjectivity Ltd: The Discourse of Liability in the Joint Stock Companies 
Act of 1856 and Gaskell’s Cranford, 61 ENG. LITERARY HIST. 139, 141 (1994) (commenting on 
Dickens). 
 6. RAYMOND WILLIAMS, THE COUNTRY AND THE CITY 219 (1973). 
 7. ELIZABETH GASKELL, NORTH AND SOUTH 118 (1855). Gaskell’s plot turns on similar 
themes to those found in CHARLES DICKENS, HARD TIMES (Longman 2003) (1854). 
 8. GASKELL, supra note 7, at 420. For a discussion of the idea of the “cash nexus,” see 
THOMPSON, supra note 2, at 79. 
2013] Corporate Governance as a School of Social Reform 975 
vate solution in North and South,” Catherine Gallagher writes, “does not 
entail a retreat from social responsibility; rather, it is a solution that 
clears away practical barriers to social harmony.”9 In other words, class 
conflict is resolved in the novel because contractual relations transform 
into friendships. 
In the narrative, redemption comes through attention to the perspec-
tives of others and to a new sense of responsibility that dissolves Mr. 
Thornton’s sense of a divide between his private and public selves. His 
renewed responsibility emerges from the domestic, private sphere, which 
acts as a “school of social reform.”10 Thus, capitalism was redeemed 
through reform of the owner-manager himself. The “cash-nexus” of pro-
duction was not imagined as necessarily remote and separate from the 
notional private realm. Though not fully integrated with it, it was de-
pendent upon it: the moral life of capitalism was the moral life of the 
capitalist. 
The subsequent separation of ownership and control that emerges 
with the switch from owner–manager capitalism to shareholder capital-
ism connoted the company as “hollowed out” with regard to its relation-
ship to individual moral agency. Companies, as they emerge with share-
holder capitalism, are “often seen as rather malleable, as empty or half 
empty vessels into which different contents can be poured; entities whose 
direction and behaviour are determined, as it were, from the outside— 
from who controls them—rather than from within.”11 As Paddy Ireland 
points out, the managerial theories of the mid-twentieth century and 
more recent stakeholder models are inspired by this “hollowing out” to 
advocate corporate governance models that license orientations beyond 
the shareholder.12 
Beyond that, the mainstream finance-based Anglo-American model 
of corporate governance,13 which views the company as a series of multi-
level markets for contract generation and contract management, holds to 
a similar hollowing out thesis. But in this model, the company is less an 
articulation of the board’s will and more a series of signals to markets. 
                                                 
 9. GALLAGHER, supra note 4, at 177. 
 10. Id. at 115. 
 11. Paddy Ireland, Capitalism Without the Capitalist, 17 J. LEGAL HIST. 41, 69 (1996). 
 12. Id. 
 13. See FRANK EASTERBROOK & DANIEL FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF 
CORPORATE LAW (1991); REINIER KRAAKMAN ET AL., THE ANATOMY OF CORPORATE LAW: A 
COMPARATIVE AND FUNCTIONAL APPROACH (2009); Henry Hansmann & Reinier H. Kraakman, The 
End of History for Corporate Law, 89 GEO. L.J. 439 (2001); Michael C. Jensen & William H. 
Meckling, Theory of the Firm, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976); Michael C. Jensen, Value Maximization, 
Stakeholder Theory, and the Corporate Objective Function, 22 J. APPLIED CORP. FIN. 32 (2010). 
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The standard thesis is similar to the managerial and stakeholder positions 
Ireland outlines in that it assumes corporate personality to have dissipat-
ed with the separation of ownership and control. For Ireland himself, the 
company is a “personification of industrial capital” and is subject to the 
“relentless logic”14 of capitalism in its behavior and form. What is miss-
ing in all these hollowing out perspectives is the kind of definite moral 
anchor for corporate conduct that was held to exist when corporate and 
individual conduct were more closely aligned. As I argue in the follow-
ing sections, the corporation, floating free of individual moral person-
hood, creates a kind of moral personhood through narratives that seek to 
define and stabilize the firm’s conduct and character.15 
These narratives of moral personhood draw on the conventions of 
moral economy16—struggles and conventions through which questions of 
distribution, desert, and economic order in society are debated and re-
solved—so as to lend internal coherence to the productive and discipli-
nary practices of the firm and to provide external context for corporate 
action. Furthermore, prevailing ideas of how the company and its pur-
pose ought to be characterized act as transmission mechanisms that ex-
plain and mediate the company and wider market imperatives at work in 
society. 
In analyzing the corporation’s character narrative, a critical consid-
eration is the concept of social responsibility and its role in articulating a 
public face for the corporation. I point to the manner in which responsi-
bility narratives are aligned with wider norms and imperatives in the 
structure of the firm and as conceived through the ideological precepts of 
market-driven social reform. 
The question of personhood is most useful in interrogating issues of 
corporate responsibility. It helps in understanding the company as a uni-
fied agent characterized by the production of moral narratives. But that is 
not to say that I see the company as intrinsically a person. The company 
is, rather, a fictional person, whose sense of intentionality and agency is 
generated from the narratives attached to it. Those narratives are them-
selves not intrinsic but are the product of negotiation and conflict over 
ambiguous resources, laws, and rules attached to economic production 
                                                 
 14. Ireland, supra note 11, at 69. 
 15. See Ciarán O’Kelly & Melvin Dubnick, Power and the Ethics of Reform, in ETHICS IN 
PUBLIC MANAGEMENT (H. George Frederickson & Richard K. Ghere eds., 2d ed. 2013) (discussing 
organizational ethics and the struggle to define the organizational purpose, albeit regarding the pub-
lic sector). 
 16. For information on the concept of moral economy, see SCOTT, supra note 2; THOMPSON, 
supra note 2; William James Booth, On the Idea of the Moral Economy, 88 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 653 
(1994). 
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and the myths and conventions of social life to which those negotiations 
and conflicts refer.17 Personhood here is performative. 
Through this lens, corporate responsibility is more than a strategic 
focus on corporate executives’ “reputation, competitiveness[,] and risk-
management.”18 Instead, we should view corporate responsibility as an 
attempt to focus and define the company, to situate and personify itself 
as a set of “practices and institutions that surround the moral life,”19 and 
to explain itself in terms of ordinary moral life. The business case for 
moral responsibility, though important, is only half the picture.20 Corpo-
rate responsibility is a struggle to articulate a kind of moral standing in-
wardly toward the corporation as well as outwardly toward society at 
large. While I argue for a thicker sense of corporate responsibility 
through a discussion of personhood, I do not claim that that responsibil-
ity is necessarily radical or transformative.21 My claim, rather, is that 
corporate responsibility reflects an incessant desire to embed the compa-
ny in ordinary moral life. 
In the next part of the Article, I give an account of the company as a 
unified moral agent. Following the work of List and Pettit,22 I focus on 
the company’s emergence through struggles to negotiate and define its 
practices and institutions through broader social myths and conventions. 
I discuss narratives and personhood, both in natural persons and in the 
company. I show how the shortcomings of the narrative self in natural 
persons actually make the concept more telling for companies. I point to 
                                                 
 17. See John W. Meyer & Brian Rowan, Institutionalized Organizations, 83 AM. J. SOC. 340 
(1977); see also Lauren B. Edelman & Mark C. Suchman, The Legal Environments of Organiza-
tions, 23 ANN. REV. SOC. 479 (1997) [hereinafter Edelman & Suchman, Legal Environments]; Mark 
C. Suchman & Lauren B. Edelman, Legal Rational Myths, 21 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 903 (1996) 
[hereinafter Suchman & Edelman, Rational Myths]. 
 18. DEPARTMENT OF TRADE AND INDUSTRY, BUSINESS AND SOCIETY: DEVELOPING 
CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY IN THE UK (2001) (U.K.); see Simon Deakin, Squaring the 
Circle? Shareholder Value and Corporate Social Responsibility in the U.K., 70 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 
976, 985 (2002). 
 19. Terry Pinkard, Virtues, Morality and Sittlichkeit, 7 EUR. J. PHIL. 217, 226 (1999) (calling 
the emergence of such practices and institutions a “Sittlichkeit,” that is, the set of “practices and 
institutions that surround the moral life”). 
 20. See David Millon, Two Models of Corporate Social Responsibility, 46 WAKE FOREST L. 
REV. 523 (2011); see also David J. Vogel, Is There a Market for Virtue?, 47 CAL. MGMT. REV. 19 
(2005). 
 21. See Ronen Shamir, Corporate Social Responsibility, 9 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 371 
(2008); Ronen Shamir, The De-Radicalization of Corporate Social Responsibility, 30 CRITICAL SOC. 
669 (2004); see also Paddy Ireland & Renginee G. Pillay, CSR and Changing Modes of Governance, 
in CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY AND REGULATORY GOVERNANCE: TOWARDS INCLUSIVE 
DEVELOPMENT? 77 (Peter Utting & José Carlos Marques eds., 2009) [hereinafter CORPORATE 
SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY]. 
 22. CHRISTIAN LIST & PHILIP PETTIT, GROUP AGENCY (2011). 
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the manner in which the dynamics of corporate moral personhood act at 
the level of the economy as transmission mechanisms between society 
and market. In the part after that, I draw out some of the character of 
corporate responsibility through an analysis of corporate reports, focus-
ing especially on HSBC and Barclays Bank in the U.K. I point to the 
shift in the company’s moral narratives toward a conception of responsi-
bility as doing business well. 
III. THE COMPANY AS A UNIFIED MORAL AGENT 
When it came to the kind of capitalist organization described by 
Gaskell, the moral character of the organization arose from its associa-
tion with the capitalist. There was little sense of a distinctive corporate 
personhood in the terms I set out above because the company as a dis-
tinct entity was not fully realized. As a consequence, the company was 
also accessible to the moral predilections of capitalists. For instance, the 
religious senses of some manufacturers famously prompted them to pur-
sue a less brutal—if more patriarchal—factory capitalism than they 
might otherwise have done. Taking one prominent example, urban spac-
es were constructed through the nineteenth and into the twentieth century 
with a view toward workers’ welfare, broadly speaking.23 Social respon-
sibility was, in these cases, not corporate, but personal. Owner–manager 
power—even if it was conceived in highly patriarchal terms—was not 
minimized through the imagined equality of contract, nor was it dis-
missed as beyond the capacities of capitalism. 
The understanding of personalized capitalism upon which North 
and South sits is at odds from the capitalism that emerges with the sepa-
ration of ownership and control. The potential for a more extensive par-
tiality fades in the face of the emergence of the company as a standalone 
device. Whereas capitalism imagined in Victorian England was restored 
to society through the owner-manager, the separation of ownership and 
control sees the modern company cast adrift from capitalists. 
After all, the separation of ownership and control implies the sepa-
ration of individual moral sentiments from action in production. Manage-
rial power is imagined as being put to the service of a passive sharehold-
ing body. This lends a twofold distance from moral reasoning over cor-
porate actions when managers decline to follow their moral predilections. 
                                                 
 23. For a discussion on Cadbury, see Charles Dellheim, The Creation of a Company Culture, 
92 AM. HIST. REV. 13 (1987); Charles Wilson, Economy and Society in Late Victorian Britain, 18 
ECON. HIST. REV. 183 (1965); see also David J. Jeremy, The Enlightened Paternalist in Action, 33 
BUS. HIST. 58 (1991); Michael Rowlinson & John Hassard, The Invention of Corporate Culture, 46 
HUM. REL. 299 (1993). 
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First, it creates distance from moral reasoning where those predilections 
conflict with their duties to the company’s members. Second, sharehold-
ers cannot bring their moral reasoning to bear because they have very 
little control over the everyday actions of the company beyond those re-
served for them in the articles of association.24 
One might ask what the separation of ownership and control means 
for responsibility. Elizabeth Wolgost provides one possible answer: re-
sponsibility more or less disappears.25 I suggest a different tack, howev-
er. While it is true that the separation of ownership and control is also the 
separation of corporate action from individual moral sentiments, this 
does not necessarily mean that the company loses its moral content on 
the whole. Rather, the company is personified through the development 
of its own moral narrative. 
My central claim is that narratives of responsibility are narratives of 
personhood. Much energy is expended on situating the company in a 
moral environment, providing a context through which it can be under-
stood and explained, both internally and externally. Through this en-
deavor we see the emergence of the company as an unified and autono-
mous agent. Following List and Pettit, corporate personhood is performa-
tive: it suggests that “a person is an agent who can perform effectively in 
the space of obligations.”26 
So, I take personhood to relate to the performance of agency in a 
sphere of mutual obligations. I also see this performance—intentionality 
around the “presentation of a moral self”27—as defined and shaped by an 
intense concern with the construction of a normative environment around 
which the firm coheres. Performative personhood occurs, on this level, in 
the eyes of others. Adam Smith states that  
man naturally desires, not only to be loved, but to be lovely; or to be 
that thing which is the natural and proper object of love [and] he 
naturally dreads, not only to be hated, but to be hateful; or to be that 
thing which is the natural and proper object of hatred.28  
                                                 
 24. See, e.g., Automatic Self-Cleansing Filter Syndicate Co. v. Cuninghame, [1906] 2 Ch. 34 
(U.K.). The balance of power over action was established in large part by the beginning of the twen-
tieth century, from that point on, shareholder decision making was limited to questions over the trade 
in shares rather than over the government of companies. 
 25. ELIZABETH WOLGAST, ETHICS OF AN ARTIFICIAL PERSON (1992). 
 26. LIST & PETTIT, supra note 22, at 173. As such, I do not imbue the corporation with intrinsic 
personhood. Nor do I view the issue of personhood as a thin metaphorical matter, little more than 
useful shorthand for the purposes of contract management. 
 27. ERVING GOFFMAN, THE PRESENTATION OF SELF IN EVERYDAY LIFE (1969). 
 28. ADAM SMITH, THE THEORY OF MORAL SENTIMENTS 132 (2002). 
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If this is correct, then we should see the performance of moral self-
hood—the situating of self in broad societal norms—as placing the com-
pany far beyond formal and procedural domains. 
This is not to say that the performance of personhood is directly and 
explicitly a function of the company or its directing minds, though they 
are obviously powerful agents in any particular situation. The company’s 
moral character does not exist as an institution fixed in its character, de-
fined by law, and brought to markets ready-made. Rather, it emerges 
from an uncertain and contingent interplay of laws, rules, and conven-
tions, and from the negotiation of and struggles over how those laws, 
rules, and conventions can be defined and applied. 
This interplay is necessarily underpinned by a series of myths and 
“widespread understandings of social reality.”29 Such myths emerge from 
and are acted upon by a myriad of social forces—not least, those arising 
from organizational persons negotiating and internalizing their own regu-
latory landscapes.30 As Suchman and Edelman have said about law in 
general, it is 
actually a welter of conflicting principles, imperfect analogies, and 
ambiguous generalities. Thus, lawyers, judges, enforcers, and target 
populations negotiate the meaning of law in each application, seek-
ing workable consensus rather than logical certainty.31 
Similar things might be said about the constitutional, contractual, 
and cultural forms that emerge through and are brought to bear upon the 
corporation. The law’s regulatory landscapes, in the broadest sense, do 
not act upon social and corporate realities. They are constitutive of social 
and corporate realities. These landscapes do not act upon ready-made 
markets: they constitute the many markets—for products, for shares, for 
talent—through which the company is defined. A performative person-
hood emerges through these ambiguities, not least as an attempt to solidi-
fy and define a coherent corporate environment with the goal of directing 
and controlling the workforce and other aspects of production. 
Thus, narratives surrounding the corporate form both evolve in ac-
cordance with wider myths and norms pertaining to capital and produc-
tion—with questions of moral economy—and articulate the emergence 
of the corporate person through the shifting power structures of corporate 
governance. Of course, the character of the corporate person and its pres-
                                                 
 29. Meyer & Rowan, supra note 17, at 347. 
 30. See Lauren B. Edelman & Mark C. Suchman, When the ‘Haves’ Hold Court, 33 LAW & 
SOC’Y REV. 941 (1999). 
 31. Suchman & Edelman, Rational Myths, supra note 17, at 932. 
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ence in society is itself unstable because it tracks the shifting balances of 
power within corporations, and between corporations and other institu-
tions and realms in social and economic life.32 It is within this context 
that we should see the company’s moral personhood emerge. 
Performative personhood is focused on the construction of moral 
narratives that provide a context for production. These narratives in turn 
rely on wider moral economy—struggles over the questions of distribu-
tion, desert, and hierarchy. The company—cast free of the capitalist—
continues to seek out a moral character. The corporate narrative of self-
hood emerges from an attempt to situate the company in broader practic-
es and institutions. More than that, however, the corporation actively 
constructs practices and institutions through its metrics-generation capac-
ities, hierarchical structures, and social power. Without minimizing its 
own keying into existing conventions, the company, far more than any 
natural person, shapes the landscape within which it acts. 
IV. NARRATIVES AND PERSONHOOD 
The idea of narrative selfhood has been invoked as a mode of un-
derstanding human moral life. Charles Taylor said the following with 
respect to the development of a sense of the good: 
[It] has to be woven into my understanding of my life as an unfold-
ing story. But this is to state another basic condition of making 
sense of ourselves, that we grasp our lives in a narrative. . . . It has 
often been remarked that making sense of one’s life as a story is al-
so, like orientation to the good, not an optional extra; that our lives 
exist also in this space of questions, which only a coherent narrative 
can answer. In order to have a sense of who we are, we have to have 
a notion of how we have become, and of where we are going.33 
Our moral lives, in other words, represent an important part of our con-
stituting ourselves through the production of stories about our lives as a 
whole. 
That said, in her discussion of narratives of selfhood (both factual 
and normative), Samantha Vice disputes the claim that “having a differ-
ent self-conception from one that is narrative in form (assuming this is 
possible) is mistaken in a very significant way.”34 She suggests that the 
“chancy and incomplete”35 character of human life is not well encom-
                                                 
 32. For a longer discussion, see Ciarán O’Kelly & Sally Wheeler, Internalities and the Foun-
dations of Corporate Governance, 21 SOC. & LEG. S. 469 (2012). 
 33. CHARLES TAYLOR, SOURCES OF THE SELF 47 (1989). 
 34. Samantha Vice, Literature and the Narrative Self, 78 PHILOSOPHY 93, 94 (2003). 
 35. Id. at 107. 
982 Seattle University Law Review [Vol. 36:973 
passed by the narrative form. In other words, while we are tempted to 
present ourselves in a story form, our lives as lived are more nuanced, 
more complicated, and quite often, more mundane than narratives allow. 
While we may turn to the narrative form in our autobiographical mo-
ments, for the most part, “we just live.”36 
What Vice points out as a weakness in the “narrative self” meta-
phor—that its tidiness and artificiality do not map onto human life as it is 
in fact lived—is actually what makes the metaphor work when it is ap-
plied to the personhood of the firm. The inner life of the firm seems a 
perfect locus for the emergence of a narrative self. Contrary to stand-
points in the finance-oriented and stakeholder traditions mentioned by 
Ireland—whereby the firm is hollowed out due to the separation of own-
ership and control—the company as it re-emerged is embodied by the 
production of narratives presenting itself to a multiplicity of observers. 
Floating free of the moral lives of capitalists has not left the company 
hollowed out. Rather, the company seeks to define and set out its moral 
landscape through the production of narratives of selfhood. 
Narrative is crucial for thinking about the performative personhood 
of the company because, at base, the company acts as a narrative-
generating institution. The “practices and institutions” of moral life are 
defined and generated with reference to the “myths” and conventions of 
social life,37 but the company and its governance are distinctive in that 
the company explains itself as embedded in moral life. 
The company’s public face and its internal system of justifications 
are explanation all the way down, or more succinctly, they are a narra-
tive. The company generates its own practices and institutions largely 
within the company but also beyond the company’s bounds. Governance 
processes and procedures within the company, and the dynamics of ad-
monition and approbation that are driven by them, all rely on the compa-
ny manufacturing a normative environment through which action can be 
explained and from there structured and controlled. 
Discipline cannot simply act through force. As Foucault points out, 
the normalization of discipline—rendering it invisible so that coercion 
becomes collaboration—is the most effective way to structure social in-
stitutions and the individuals who work within them.38 Without the man-
ufacturing of explanatory narratives or production of “justificatory 
                                                 
 36. Id. at 108. 
 37. Meyer & Rowan, supra note 17. 
 38. MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH 187 (1979); see also John Roberts & Robert 
W. Scapens, Accounting as Discipline, in CRITICAL ACCOUNTS 107 (David J. Cooper & Trevor M. 
Hopper eds., 1990). 
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truths,”39 discipline simply becomes a site of conflict. However, by pro-
ducing those narratives, internal work can be given purpose. 
Governance processes are not disciplinary only in prohibitory 
terms. They are also acted out as licenses, defining and allocating both 
material and normative values throughout the organization. “An occupa-
tion,” according to E. C. Hughes, “consists, in part, of a successful claim 
of some people to licence to carry out certain activities which others may 
not, and to do so in exchange for money, goods or services.”40 And while 
the company is shaped in large part by the human society it draws on,41 it 
refines and enhances social norms toward corporate ends and then pro-
motes and demotes in line with those norms. Corporate capitalism, in this 
sense, chooses its own virtues. 
Similarly, beyond the company, the company and corporate gov-
ernance are set out through corporate reports, a social-responsibility 
presence, and various signals to markets, policy makers, and other pub-
lics. Again, these external features are meaningless without some kind of 
normative content. The ambiguous, negotiated character of the compa-
ny42 must be established in a manner that allows the company to cohere 
internally and to conduct itself (and control its environment) externally. 
This is the core of performative personhood. 
This is not simply about the exercise of corporate power. The con-
struction of a moral environment—through an interaction with forces 
within and without the firm—involves an effort to explain and negotiate 
the embeddedness of the company in the ordinary moral world, and sim-
ultaneously, to ground the various ways in which work within the com-
pany and corporate action can be set apart from “ordinary” moral life. 
The corporate environment on these terms is socially and institutionally 
educative. 
V. THE COMPANY AS A TRANSMISSION MECHANISM 
So, when we think of the company as “personifying capital,” we 
should think of it as manufacturing and disseminating narratives that set 
out its place in the social environment and that justify its internal struc-
tures and wider social role. This brings us to one crucial issue arising 
                                                 
 39. RICHARD RORTY, PHILOSOPHY AND THE MIRROR OF NATURE 383 (1980) (speaking of 
“justificatory truths” as “the moral philosopher’s special form of bad faith,” whereby people present 
moral vocabularies as facts and seek to enforce standpoints as a result; for instance, the presentation 
of the company as a nexus of contracts is arguably just such a maneuver). 
 40. EVERETT CHERRINGTON HUGHES, MEN AND THEIR WORK 78 (1958). 
 41. See ROSABETH MOSS KANTER, MEN AND WOMEN OF THE CORPORATION (rev. ed. 1993). 
 42. See Suchman & Edelman, Rational Myths, supra note 17; see also Edelman & Suchman, 
Legal Environments, supra note 17. 
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from the narration of the company’s moral life: broad ideas of the com-
pany shape conceptions of political economy. Prevailing ideas of the 
company act as transmission mechanisms, providing a moral context and 
grounding to the market economy. 
Much has been written about the liberal and neoliberal claims on 
“self-ordering”43 markets as free-standing “sites of truth”44 where ques-
tions of justice have no place. For Polanyi, the utopian project to 
disembed market from society, although doomed for failure, presents a 
mortal risk to society as a whole45 as the spontaneous ordering mecha-
nisms of markets are extended ever further into social life. The disruptive 
force of markets sees alternative social structures set aside if they cannot 
be reconfigured as subject to the account-making and value requirements 
of market orders.46 By this measure, markets are a standard of legibility 
against which society must be held.47 
For most people, the corporation mediates more or less all interac-
tion with market forces today. Our economic life, in other words, is a 
corporate life. It may be that this is experienced as the invocation and 
enforcement of supposedly iron market laws, shorn of moral content. 
This might not be the norm, however. Take the issue of employment and 
corporate downsizing: layoffs are often presented as inescapable prod-
ucts of market forces. This is articulated in more nuanced ways than 
would be suggested by the idea that the corporation treats market forces 
as a simple fait accompli. 
Take for instance an admiring account of Jack Welch’s downsizing 
scheme that reduced General Electric’s workforce by close to 100,000 
people during the 1980s: 
Jack Welch countered that nothing—including one’s job—could be 
considered sacred, and he had a forceful argument for this reason-
ing. Ultimately, all that mattered was the survival of the company. 
That was what counted most, not any particular job. He knew that 
his downsizing program would cause pain, a great deal of pain, yet 
it could not be helped. Not if General Electric was to survive and 
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flourish in a more competitive global arena. Welch was prepared to 
be stoic, though he admitted in later years that downsizing was the 
worst part of his job.48 
This passage indicates a common position on the market—the 
“competitive global arena”—as a “site of truth.”49 Nothing, it seems, is 
stable in the face of market pressures; jobs, and the allocation of capital 
that they embody, simply come and go. The company’s survival and ex-
pansion is the key duty, and by implication the key facet of “leadership” 
is “all that matters.” Such a narrative, in this particular example, allows 
Welch to both design and enforce a strategy that leads to job losses, and 
to simultaneously hold that the job losses, although regretful, are not 
morally attached to him. They are inevitabilities that “could not be 
helped.” 
This stance is emblematic of how the instrumental logic of capital-
ism is transmitted through the moral logic of corporate governance. It 
may be that the corporate officer, having caused these actions, suffers 
“agent-regret.”50 The officer wishes that these things had not come about. 
This is different, however, from believing that some other course was 
possible or that the corporate officer, though an agent, was an agent in a 
morally relevant fashion when he or she acted. Yet this is in itself a mor-
al narrative. It focuses on ideas of duty and office that override other 
considerations. The narrative posits and explains corporate work as a 
special realm and license for action. While the roles inherent in corporate 
work involve action that is distinctive from “ordinary” moral life, these 
roles are connected to ordinary notions of duty and desert.51 
The “new employment contract”52 has seen the legitimation of cor-
porate capitalism through job security replaced by legitimation through 
job satisfaction, which is another demonstration of the corporation work-
ing as a transmission mechanism between market and society. This rela-
tionship between organization, work, economic security, and career re-
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flects a profound shift in corporate capitalism’s moral economy, through 
which questions about economic and social power distribution are 
matched discourse about fairness.53 Corporate commitments to workers’ 
livelihoods, at least in the Anglo-American economic spheres, have been 
replaced by narratives and structures referring to the individual’s respon-
sibility—using opportunities provided by the corporate context—to de-
velop their human capital.54 Corporations have not only incorporated 
“societally legitimated rationalised elements”55 into their structures, but 
have also driven the narratives that legitimate those elements. At least by 
the lights of this perspective, responsibility for careers has been handed 
over to individuals who are encouraged to develop their own paths 
through economic life. 
Reference to market forces has involved more than a simple dismis-
sal of qualms or queries through the invocation of the market as a “black 
box.” Instead, we see an emphasis placed on virtues of duty and loyalty 
to the company. There is some evidence that this has been accompanied 
by broader shifts in attitudes toward corporate power, which accepts the 
place of market forces in economic life. Individuals may be responsive to 
such narratives in devising a sense of fairness relating to corporate 
layoffs.56 Given this, the corporate economy has, so far, been quite suc-
cessful in concocting a moral language around markets, and in negotiat-
ing its own legitimacy, despite its dominant position over most people’s 
lives and the evidence of layoffs’ damaging effects.57 
These narratives, often presented as “justificatory truths,” “grow 
legs”58 in an environment that takes those claims as both an explanation 
for current trends and as legitimation for those who benefit from those 
trends. The production of economic theory as the discovery of new truths 
is also the production of legitimatizing norms. Nonetheless, it is im-
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portant to note the role that the idea of the company plays in transmitting 
a moral vocabulary for market capitalism, not least because of its pres-
ence in both a series of market arenas and in “ordinary” society.59 This is 
not to say that the moral vocabularies of capitalism are made by the 
company as a pre-existing object; rather, they are performed and narrated 
through the company. Corporate personhood, emergent through the per-
formance of a justificatory narrative, acts to explain the wider vicissi-
tudes of capitalism in society. It re-embeds the economy in society’s 
moral landscape. 
The construction of practices and institutions—and through them 
the performative personhood of the firm—takes place almost solely 
through the narrative form. Whereas, as Vice says, natural persons “just 
live,” firms present themselves and live through the stories they make 
because, ultimately, they are little more than stories—whether in terms of 
founding metrics and processes of admonition and approbation, or in 
terms of describing their own place in the world. The fictional person of 
the firm must rely on the form and format of fiction, through the produc-
tion and placing of character in the world, in order to live.60 
In this part, I have set out a substantial sense of corporate person-
hood as a narrative-based performance that both creates and is sustained 
by its own institutions and practices. Corporate personhood, by this light, 
is a pattern of justification, and this pattern, through processes of “legit-
imation and institutionalization,” makes the firm appear as a “natural and 
meaningful,”61 wholly unified agent.62 The company, cast adrift of the 
capitalist, is still subject to, and seeks, efforts to define and sustain its 
place in the world. As I set out in the next section, narratives of corporate 
responsibility go to the heart of patterns of justification. 
VI. THE EMERGENCE OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AS A SCHOOL OF 
SOCIAL REFORM 
The idea of the company’s moral personhood and the role of the 
idea of the company as a transmission mechanism is seen to play out 
with regard to the rise of corporate governance itself—of doing business 
well—as a core dimension of social responsibility. As explained above, 
separated from the capitalist with the separation of ownership and con-
trol, the company was no longer in a position to avail itself of a mediated 
moral sense transmitted through the capitalist. So, as with Mr. Thornton 
                                                 
 59. See KANTER, supra note 41. 
 60. Vice, supra note 34, at 10. 
 61. Mark C. Suchman, Managing Legitimacy, 20 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 571, 576 (1995). 
 62. LIST & PETTIT, supra note 22, at 31. 
988 Seattle University Law Review [Vol. 36:973 
in North and South, it was no longer possible to reform the corporation’s 
presence in the world through individual redemption. There was no ac-
cess to corporate reform through “schools of social reform” as individu-
als encountered. Cast adrift, the company has sought narrative ties 
through which it could be explained and personified. These ties, and the 
institutions from which they arise, tend to situate themselves in wider 
“myths” and “understandings of social reality.”63 
In this part, I present a brief discussion of the switch to sustainabil-
ity and citizenship, especially drawing on the corporate reporting of two 
financial institutions: Barclays Bank and HSBC. While the position of 
the financial sector is interesting because the current crisis is of its own 
making, Barclays is particularly interesting because of its recent invoca-
tion of citizenship narratives through its “Citizenship 2015” initiative.64 
HSBC, as we see below, is interesting because its reports bear witness to 
a switch from a “gift-giving” to a “sustainability” mode. 
The main aim of this part is to set out a sense of sustainability as a 
form of corporate personhood that reflects a particular sense of the cor-
porate person as arising from market-driven social imperatives. Recall 
that corporate personhood, here, involves the productions of narratives 
that both explain and justify the corporation’s place in society, and that 
also act as a transmission mechanism between market and society. It is 
the “personification of industrial capitalism,” as Paddy Ireland had it, 
though not as a simple cipher; it personifies capitalism and moral econ-
omy by adopting many of the key aspects of moral personhood.65 
A. Gifts and Corporate Philanthropy 
Although there is a long-standing history of addressing corporate 
responsibility issues through ideas of citizenship,66 much of the corpora-
tion’s actions are focused on corporate giving. While “the link between 
these gifts and the interests of shareholders was indirect,”67 corporate 
giving, as the action driven by ideas of corporate responsibility, was usu-
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ally performed in line with ideas of responsibility as reputation, competi-
tiveness, and risk management.68 
Alongside this, corporations allowed themselves to be recruited as 
collaborators in state-led regeneration projects.69 More recently, the 
United Kingdom has entered into effective partnerships with government 
in nonprofit academy schools and in constructing semipublic spaces 
around healthcare and entertainment. Banks have become involved in 
financial-literacy educational schemes and microfinance initiatives, 
which I discuss below. 
While the gift-giving style of corporate social responsibility (CSR) 
is effective as a form of marketing and managing image and reputation, it 
has done little to integrate the company into society. Instead, it empha-
sizes corporate domination over people’s lives. Gifts, as Marcel Mauss 
put it, are “total social phenomena” that bind giver and receiver in socie-
ty. “[T]o refuse to give, to fail to invite, just as to refuse to accept, is tan-
tamount to declaring war; it is to reject the bond of alliance and com-
monality.”70 The receiver of the gift is not a simple beneficiary if the gift 
cannot be reciprocated. They must return the gift through obedience and 
respect for the giver’s authority: they are in the giver’s debt.71 
The gift-giving style of CSR in parallel to this account rejects a 
conception of the company that sees it beyond the realm of “ordinary 
moral community.” It stands outside the normal flows of moral commu-
nity, seeking to legitimatize itself through the provision of patronage and 
gifts. Following Dinah Rajak’s formulation, it is possible to see this style 
of CSR as being “characterised not by the Maussian ideal of mutual in-
terdependence, but by deference and dependency in return for the pa-
tron’s provision.”72 We should be cognizant of the fact that the quest for 
legitimation is, in itself, a sign of mutual dependency.73 Responsibility by 
these lights is a strategy: it is not characterized by a will to restore ordi-
nary values to production. 
The emergence of sustainability and citizenship narratives in these 
kinds of discussions around CSR is interesting here. As the Watkinson 
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report highlighted,74 the alignment of social responsibility with corporate 
governance and a more expansive community involvement is not new. 
Nonetheless, the rise in corporate social reporting, and in the standalone 
social report in particular, has been paralleled by the rise of sustainability 
as a key norm in corporate narratives. I argue that this reflects a new, 
more cohesive personification of the company as social responsibility 
comes into line with market values. 
The remainder of this part is divided into three sections. First, I dis-
cuss the rise of sustainability narratives in the corporate reports of Bar-
clays and HSBC. Second, returning to the discussion of corporate per-
sonhood above, I suggest that sustainability narratives seek both to em-
bed the company in the “ordinary” moral world. Finally, I discuss the 
manner in which the emergence of sustainability narratives as core ideas 
of corporate responsibility serves to transmit broad neoliberal norms by 
positing corporate governance as social responsibility in itself. 
B. Social-Responsibility Reports 
The rise of the standalone social-responsibility report has tended to 
coincide with the emergence of sustainability narratives and perhaps, just 
as importantly, with governmental, nongovernmental, and quasi-
governmental partnership initiatives oriented toward CSR.75 Codes of 
conduct, such as the “Equator Principles”76 and the U.N. Global Com-
pact,77 are monitored and measured both by NGOs and by consultants in 
order to bring transparency to reports. To highlight their sustainability 
credentials, companies may collaborate and indeed compete over the top 
spot in responsibility indexes through organizations like Business in the 
Community.78 
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The crucial switch in responsibility narratives is from the gift-
giving accounts presented above and corporate governance-oriented nar-
ratives. While the switch often predates the adoption of standalone sus-
tainability reporting, HSBC’s report points to the juxtaposition between 
the two. Depending on what is included as a “gift,” up to half of its 2000 
report, HSBC in the Community: Sharing Our Success,79 is devoted to 
different kinds of gift-giving. These reports are focused on HSBC’s pri-
orities: education, inculcation of business and financial skills, and envi-
ronment. Interestingly, in light of the new social contract, corporate re-
sponsibility is also attached to staff giving their time to projects, presum-
ably facilitated by the company. 
Sometimes the gift-giving seems more straightforwardly philan-
thropic: 
The Prem Dan Opportunity Centre in Mumbai (formerly Bom-
bay) has given hope to thousands of children over the past 20 years. 
HSBC is supporting the founder, Sister Felicity, and her staff who 
currently teach vocational skills to more than 800 abused children in 
the centre’s three purpose-built schools, as well as providing a home 
for them.80 
In the United Kingdom, 
HSBC’s support for the Technology Colleges Trust, in particu-
lar for language colleges in underprivileged areas, continues to 
grow. Our investment in language education, particularly in Portu-
guese and Mandarin, not only reflects our international background, 
but highlights the need for greater international communication 
skills in the future.81 
The list continues with gifts to the Wildlife and Wetlands Trust, mentor-
ing programs employing HSBC staff in Buffalo, New York, ecology 
programs in New York City, and the like. 
By the time the 2010 sustainability report came about, however, the 
gift-giving mode had almost entirely disappeared. Where it remains, it is 
sharply focused on environmental gifts involving staff donations of time 
and almost exclusively on financial education.82 The dominant themes of 
the 2010 sustainability report are on the company doing business well. 
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So, its environmental credentials are set out either through its own effi-
ciency programs,83 or through the provision of financial facilities and 
services to “climate business” and other commercial opportunities with 
an environmental aspect.84 The report focuses on attracting and “valuing” 
employees, treating customers well, paying taxes, and preventing finan-
cial crime. It addresses issues around the managing of environmental and 
other risks in order to “sustain” the business because “environmental and 
social risks can have a material impact on the financial success of our 
business and that of our customers.”85 The report in general is rounded 
off with an assurance report from Price Waterhouse Coopers LLP, attest-
ing to the veracity of the report.86 
The journey between early and more recent reports is less stark in 
the case of Barclays Bank, whose reports across the decade have posi-
tioned it firmly in the “business case” camp when it comes to CSR.87 The 
Corporate Social Responsibility Report 2002: Making Business Sense, 
focused on four dimensions: CSR in the marketplace, the workplace, the 
community, and the environment.88 
Roughly half the text in the 2002 report was devoted to CSR in the 
marketplace and in the workplace. In the discussion of CSR in the mar-
ketplace, the report focused on support for customers and businesses in 
deprived areas, including subsidizing credit to relatively high-risk busi-
nesses. The bank also pointed to its efforts to tackle financial exclusion, 
including making particular kinds of cards available to customers who 
might otherwise have been excluded, efforts on behalf of disabled cus-
tomers, and efforts to address financial literacy problems.89 
Regarding CSR in the workplace, the report focuses on a sequence 
of business and internal responsibility issues such as an account of the 
bank’s “building a high-performance culture . . . to help employees fulfil 
their potential.”90 Specifically, the rewards and bonus schemes that en-
courage employees to perform, and the training programs that are re-
quired for staff to perform, reflect the bank’s belief in its “duty to pro-
                                                 
 83. Id. at 18. At this stage, however, HSBC had abandoned a program to become and remain 
“carbon neutral” that had been running since 2006. 
 84. Id. at 10. 
 85. Id. at 12. 
 86. Id. at 23. 
 87. Jill Treanor, Barclays Publishes Three-Year Citizenship Plan, GUARDIAN BUS. BLOG (May 
23, 2012), http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/blog/2012/may/23/barclays-citizenship-banking. 
 88. BARCLAYS, CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY REPORT 2002: MAKING BUSINESS SENSE 
(2002), available at http://group.barclays.com/about-barclays/citizenship/our-archive. 
 89. Id. at 4–6. 
 90. Id. at 6. 
2013] Corporate Governance as a School of Social Reform 993 
vide the professional and personal development opportunities vital to 
long-term employability and job satisfaction.”91 Combined with these 
issues is an account of the bank’s engagement with trade unions through 
a partnership approach and its commitment to diversity among employ-
ees, to health and safety, including vis-à-vis HIV and AIDS, and to hu-
man rights through recruitment and labor practices. 
Already, we can see tensions in the business case mode coming to 
the fore. While incentive schemes and health and safety practices in the 
workplace are either important components of corporate management or 
conventional aspects of performance management in the financial ser-
vices industry, their role in social responsibility seems limited at best. 
The 2002 CSR report saw Barclays’s activities “in the community” 
focus on employee volunteering and on community investment, which 
was “channelled into five key areas: education, people with disabilities, 
social inclusion, the arts, and the environment.”92 Regarding employee 
giving, corporate support mostly consisted of the donation of employee 
hours to support volunteering activities. In addition, the bank gave lim-
ited support to employees’ fundraising efforts through a “pound for 
pound” program. The bank also facilitated employee giving through pay-
roll processes. In all, roughly one third of Barclays’s “in the community” 
support was in the form of direct donations, with two thirds coming from 
staff volunteering or giving.93 
The role of CSR in the environment is deemed to involve two paral-
lel concerns: first, the direct environmental impact of the corporate es-
tate, travel, paper consumption, and the like; and second, indirect impacts 
through the business’s functions. The Barclays report seeks to address 
both kinds of impact, outlining the bank’s efforts to alleviate its direct 
environmental impact through the governance of resource usages, and its 
indirect impacts through adherence to the Equator Principles and through 
the general mainstreaming of environmental-risk awareness in its lending 
activities. Consider, for instance, the bank’s environmental-risk-
management unit (ERMU): 
[It] continued to work with the Group’s credit teams worldwide to 
raise their awareness of the environmental considerations to be fac-
tored into lending decisions. Screening of commercial land offered 
as loan collateral for potential contamination is a key component of 
the company’s approach, and heightened awareness of this and oth-
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er environmental issues resulted in a 19% increase in the number of 
lending proposals referred to ERMU.94 
How the approach to environmental awareness shifts across the decade is 
one of the issues at play in this Article. 
The business case negotiates a very fine line between a position that 
“doing good for society can be good for business” and one that is more 
closely described as “business decisions that are socially beneficial,” but 
that remain primarily as business decisions. As the report says, “[o]ur 
CSR activity is founded on financial performance. Strong financial per-
formance provides a significant contribution to CSR in itself, but in addi-
tion it provides the foundation for greater aspiration and creativity in de-
veloping the CSR agenda.”95 I do not point to this mode of articulation as 
an invitation to cynicism or by way of acceptance of a Friedmanite orien-
tation to profits.96 Rather, the degree to which social-responsibility re-
porting is presented as business initiative is itself quite interesting, espe-
cially as we see the character of Barclays’s reports evolve through the 
2000s. 
When we get to the Barclays Citizenship Report in 2010,97 the four-
part structure of the 2002 report has been left behind. In terms of sub-
stantive sections we are presented with three broad themes: “the way we 
do business,” “contributing to growth,” and “supporting our communi-
ties.” Issues around giving, business management, and especially envi-
ronmental responsibility are run through each section instead of being 
separated out. 
What is most interesting, however, is that much of the report focus-
es on areas that are simply core business functions. For instance, six pag-
es on “the way we do business” are devoted to compliance with regulato-
ry requirements concerning fraud, money laundering, data protection, 
complaint-resolution governance, and customer satisfaction. Further-
more, while some of the environmental component is devoted to report-
ing on environmental-risk management in lending, this section also con-
tains information on respect for human rights, respect for diversity, and 
health and safety management in the workplace. Much of this is related 
either to statutory requirements or simply to good business practices. 
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The section on Barclays’s contribution to growth makes significant 
reference to Barclays’s tax contribution and its support for the economy 
through lending, money advice, and environmental program investment. 
For example, attention is devoted to the leadership in carbon markets and 
social investment. The report states, 
Investment managers at Barclays Wealth provide clients with 
opportunities to invest in specific environmental or social funds, as 
well as providing ethical screening for portfolios. 
Barclays also offers clients a range of themed funds, including 
low carbon Venture Capital Trusts, Enterprise Investment Schemes 
and Exchange Traded Funds, which focus on clean energy, and so-
cially responsible investment funds. 
We are also one of the largest managers of charity assets in the 
UK with a dedicated team overseeing around £2bn in assets under 
management for some of the UK’s largest charities.98 
Moving on to “supporting our communities,” the report emphasizes that 
it provides support for young entrepreneurs, access to finance for people 
who would otherwise be excluded, and staff-giving programs.99 It also 
includes a report on environmental management, such as estate manage-
ment.100 
C. Interpreting the Reports 
For our purposes, what is most striking about Barclays’s 2010 re-
port is that around 15% of the text is devoted to issues that can only be 
seen as matters of corporate governance or of “doing business well.” It is 
devoted to legal and regulatory compliance, contribution to growth 
through business activities, and similar goals. Beyond that, however, the 
report articulates a seemingly more traditional business case, reporting in 
a tone that is far more oriented toward the bank’s business activities. En-
vironmental-risk management, for instance, focuses as much on the pro-
duction of environmental-risk-management products for sale as it does 
on assessment of other investments for environmental risks. The shift is 
crucial for our understanding of how social responsibility situates the 
company as a moral person. 
Following Mauss, we might see the gift-giving responsibility mode, 
apparent in HSBC’s 2000 report, as positioning the company as being 
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somewhat outside society, situating it as dominant and powerful. The 
sustainability mode, perfected in more recent reports both from HSBC 
and Barclays, sees the company formulated less as a powerful actor do-
nating resources to favored projects and clients, and more as an ordinary 
member of moral society. The imperatives produced by environmental 
concerns have been incorporated in a broader narrative of corporate gov-
ernance in order to put forward an idea of the company as sustainable in 
the round: as a sustainable business, as an equal player in society’s envi-
ronmental project, and as an entity that is responsible simply by being 
itself well. The sustainability narrative, in short, has produced a ground 
in which a company can articulate itself as a moral end in itself—it is its 
own school of social reform. 
That is, existing practices and institutions of corporate selfhood, fo-
cused on governance and employment satisfaction norms, have keyed 
into conventions surrounding environmental concerns, and have seen the 
company reinterpreted as negotiating and defining the meaning of sus-
tainability in new ways. We ought not to see this as debasing the mean-
ing of sustainability, but as reproducing corporate personhood—an at-
tempt to produce a narrative that situates and lends coherence to the 
company, naming its place in society and giving purpose to its internal 
functions and work. 
The metrics-based workings of sustainability narratives are them-
selves revealing. Whereas gift-giving, as Vogel says, cannot be linked to 
the interests of shareholders with any ease, sustainability narratives pre-
sent the company more completely as investor oriented while simultane-
ously presenting corporate governance and management as morally ordi-
nary. Responsibility is held to simply mean running the company well, 
treating staff well, obeying the law, and innovating in new markets. And 
all this is amenable to the company’s metrics-generation capacities, 
whether through external audit or internal control. 
More than that, the rise of sustainability narratives acts as a trans-
mission mechanism that seeks to bring corporate conduct and the hierar-
chies, disciplines, and licences of corporate economy as a whole to socie-
ty. It seeks to reinforce the myths and conventions through which a 
broadly neoliberal moral economy is established. As such, sustainability 
is far more substantial than “greenwash” allegations suggest. It is not the 
environmental actions arising from sustainability narratives that are most 
telling—they are often adopted and abandoned in line with business im-
peratives. Its substance lies in the sustainable business in the round. Sus-
tainable corporate governance itself, by this measure, is not simply the 
school of social reform for the corporation. In its adherence to duties, to 
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satisfaction in work, and to cohesive social relations, corporate govern-
ance is held as a school of social reform for society as a whole. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
The corporate economy cannot and does not persist on the basis of 
force. Rather, it persists on the basis of ongoing attempts to define and 
align the institutions and practices of the corporation and its markets in 
terms of the broader myths and conventions of moral economy. The cor-
poration—its personhood arising from attempts to provide it with a moral 
narrative to find its place in programs of social reform—acts to transmit 
the vicissitudes of economy in moral terms. Sustainability is its most co-
hesive program yet, bringing together the corporation’s disciplinary 
mechanisms, its productive capacities, and its hierarchical structures in 
one broad narrative. When we say that the corporation is the “personifi-
cation of capital,” we should see it as the moral voice of capitalism—an 
articulation, like it or not, of capitalism’s virtues. 
That said, we should also see the company’s moral life as con-
cerned with being the “proper object of love.”101 The moral life of the 
corporation cannot be entirely cast free from questions of moral economy 
and the broader moral life of society. While sustainability narratives re-
flect and reinforce the dominance of market norms and the role of the 
corporation in organizing those norms, we should see the corporation’s 
moral personhood as reflecting a desire to fit in. In this at least, perhaps 
the corporation may be amenable to reform, and corporate responsibility 
may reattach itself to its radical potential. 
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